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DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS IN NEBRASKA
I. INTRODUCTION
A. HISTORICAL ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REMEDY
In 1929, Nebraska adopted the Uniform Declaratory Judgments
Act which was prepared in 1922 by the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws.' The act was subsequently de-
clared constitutional in Lynn v. Kearney County.2 Today, the uni-
form act has been adopted by forty states and the remaining ten
states have some form of statutory declaratory relief.3 The federal
courts have their own declaratory judgment procedure, made avail-
able in 1934, which is similar to the uniform act.4 The procedure, as
we know it in this country, was originally developed and finally
adopted by England in 1852.5 It has been estimated that today sixty
per cent of all causes of an equitable nature in England and its
possessions are adjudicated in the form of a declaratory action.6
Perhaps overzealously, some earlier proponents saw declaratory
relief as a potential reformation of the entire English legal system.7
In any respect, the declaratory action has performed and continues
to perform a much needed function in our legal structure. The
potential use of declarations is as broad as the field of law itself.
Although the Nebraska experience with the act has been of longer
duration than that of most states, the declaratory judgment has not
been as fully utilized in this state as it has in other jurisdictions.8
1 Laws 1929, c. 75, §§ 1-16, as amended, NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-21,149---64
(Reissue 1964).
2 121 Neb. 122, 236 N.W. 192 (1931). See 10 NEB. L. BULL. 183 (1931),
where this case is noted. Also discussed in 12 NEs. L. BULL. 262 (1934).
The plaintiff, a taxpayer, successfully brought an action against Kearney
County for a declaration that the defendant county, having concluded
certain contracts for road construction with several townships in the
county, had no legal power to make and execute such contracts. The
court had no difficulty in deciding the case and upholding the Nebraska
statute.
3 See 9A UNwFoRv LAws ANN. 1 (1965).
4 48 Stat. 955 (1934), as amended, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1964).
5 15 & 16 Vict., c. 86, § 50 (1852). "No Suit in the said Court shall be
open to Objection on the Ground that a mere declaratory Decree or
Order is sought thereby, and it shall be lawful for the Court to make
binding Declarations of Right without granting consequential Relief."
6 Sheldon v. Powell, 99 Fla. 782, 789, 128 So. 258, 261 (1930).
7 BORCHAID, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 766-70 (2d ed. 1941).
8 See notes 66-71 and 90-92 infra and accompanying text.
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B. THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS
Two deficiencies in the remedies available in the ordinary law-
equity system are believed to have caused the widespread accept-
ance of the modern declaratory device." First, legal or equitable
relief is usually not available until damage has occurred. 10 The
declaratory judgment, however, serves the function of preventing
damage by extending judicial protection and relief to the complain-
ant before a wrong has been committed. The purpose of the declar-
atory judgment, as stated by the act, is to ". . . afford relief from
uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other
legal relations."" Thus, the declaratory action meets a growing
need in the modern world for a means of settling controversies be-
fore they lead to invasion of rights, repudiation of obligations, or
the commission of wrongs.12 Second, a legal or equitable remedy is
intended to provide coercive relief.13 However, a complainant may
not wish a coercive judgment; a simple declaration of his rights de-
fining the legal status of the parties may be sufficient to solve the
dispute so that the parties may voluntarily govern their conduct.
The declaratory judgment declares the rights of the parties or ex-
presses the opinion of the court on a question of law without nec-
essarily ordering anything to be done.' 4
The declaratory judgment is a procedural device intended to
supplement the relief made available by the traditional legal and
equitable remedies. Except for the absence of a prayer for coercive
relief, the petition or complaint differs in no material respect from
the form of traditional types of actions:
It [an action seeking a declaratory judgment] seeks only a final
determination, adjudication, ruling, or judgment from the court,
9 Borchard, The Next Step Beyond Equity-The Declaratory Action, 13
U. CHI. L. R.v. 145 (1946).
10 There are some exceptions, however. E.g., equity under some circum-
stances will enjoin a threatened tort or prevent the negotiation of a
fraudulent instrument.
11 NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-21,160 (Reissue 1964).
12 "The procedure has been especially useful in avoiding-. the necessity,
now so often present, of having to act at one's peril or to act on one's
own interpretation of his rights, or abandon one's rights because of a
fear of incurring damages. So now it is often necessary, in the absence
of the declaratory judgment procedure, to violate or purport to violate
a statute in order to obtain a judicial determination of its meaning or
validity." S. Rep. No. 1005, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
13 Traditional relief is usually either an award of money damages or an
order for the defendant to proceed with or refrain from a certain action.
14 However, the declaratory judgment may warrant a later equitable
decree or judgment at law. Richardson v. Waterite Co., 169 Neb. 263,
99 N.W.2d 265 (1959). See note 109 infra and accompanying text.
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but the conditions of the usual action, procedural and substantive,
must always be present, namely, the competence or jurisdiction of
the court over parties and subject-matter, the capacity of the
parties to sue and be sued, the adoption of the usual forms for
conducting judicial proceedings (including process, pleadings, and
evidence), the existence of operative facts justifying the judicial
declaration of the legal consequences, the assertion against an in-
terested party of rights capable of judicial protection, and a suffi-
cient legal interest in the moving party to entitle him to invoke
a judgment in his behalf.15
The legislature's acceptance of the declaratory judgment in
Nebraska left to the courts the task of fitting the new procedure
into the existing legal system. In interpreting the applicability of
the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, the Nebraska courts
have encountered certain basic questions faced by all courts in ad-
ministering declaratory relief: 1) How shall the availability of an-
other remedy affect the right of the parties to declaratory relief?
2) Shall the court declare the rights of parties who present no
justiciable controversy in the traditional sense but are merely seek-
ing advice on a hypothetical question? 3) How shall the court limit
the action by its judicial discretion in granting relief? The present
article will attempt to briefly survey questions concerning the avail-
ability of the remedy, explore the difficulties encountered in seeking
declaratory relief, and evaluate current use of the remedy in the
courts of Nebraska.
II. AVAILABILITY OF THE REMEDY
A. EXISTENCE OF A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY OR CLAIM
It is a well established rule under the Uniform Declaratory
Judgments Act that a proceeding for a declaratory judgment can be
instituted or maintained only in a case where there is an actual con-
troversy of a justiciable nature.16 Such a justiciable controversy is
a requirement for jurisdiction. Likewise, the Federal Declaratory
Judgment Act specifically provides that the remedy is available
only "In a case of actual controversy....
'5 Smithberger v. Banning, 130 Neb. 354, 356, 265 N.W. 10, 11 (1936), court
citing BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS -23-24 (1934).
16 Metropolitan Util. Dist. v. City of Omaha, 171- Neb. 609, 107 N.W.2d
397 (1961); Graham v. Beauchamp, 154 Neb. 889, 50 N.W.2d 104 (1951);
Nebraska Mid-State Reclamation Dist. v. Hall County, 152 Neb. 410, 41
N.W.2d 397 (1950); Redick v. Peony Park, 151 Neb. 442, 37 N.W.2d 801(1949).
17 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1964). Throughout its history the United States
Supreme Court has refused to decide moot or- hypothetical questions.
In the landmark case, Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911),
the Court citing In re Pac. Ry. Comm'n, 32 Fed. 241, 255 (1887) stated
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In Nebraska a justiciable controversy has been judicially de-
fined as a case where interested parties are asserting adverse claims
on a state of facts wherein a legal judgment is sought that would
control or direct future action.18 In dismissing cases as nonjustici-
able, the court has cast its opinions in various terms. The require-
ments of procuring declaratory relief in Nebraska were outlined in
Schroder v. City of Lincoln: 9 1) The controversy must be between
persons whose interests are adverse-or, a controversy in which a
claim of right is asserted against one who has an interest in con-
testing it. 2) The party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal
interest in the controversy-that is to say, a legally protectible
interest. 3) The issue involved in the controversy must be ripe for
judicial determination-in other words, capable of present determi-
nation and not prematurely brought before the court.20  Unless
these conditions are met, it is unlikely that an action will support a
proceeding for, or the award of, declaratory relief.
(1) Absence of An Adverse Party
The Nebraska Supreme Court found no actual justiciable con-
troversy between the plaintiffs and the two county officials named
defendants in Miller v. Stolinski.2 1 The plaintiffs sought a declara-
tory judgment as to the constitutionality of the state community
property law against the county assessor and the county treasurer of
Douglas County. The court held there were no justiciable issues
presented as the county officials made defendant did not have an
interest in the controversy. The court found that the defendants'
acts were not so definite and final as to constitute a genuine threat
to the pecuniary interests of the plaintiffs. In so holding the court
the requirements for justiciability as: ". . . claims of litigants brought
before the courts for determination by such regular proceedings as
are established by law or custom for the protection or enf6rcement, of
rights, or the prevention, redress, or punishment of wrongs .... The
term implies the existence of present or possible adverse parties whose
contentions are submitted to the court for adjudication." Id. at 357.
'When the question of the constitutionality of the federal declaratoryjudgment provision came before the Court, it was upheld, but limited
in that "The controversy must be definite and concrete, touching the
legal relations of parties having adverse- legal interests." Aetna Life
- Ins. Co. v. Haworth,..300. U.S. 227, .240 (1936). .........
18 Stanton v. Mattson, 175 Neb. 767, 123 N.W.2d 844 (1963); Graham v.
Beauchamp, 154 Neb. 889,-50 N.W.2d 104 (1951); Nebsraska Mid-State
Reclamation Dist. v. Hall County, 152 Neb. 410, 41 N.W.2d 397 (1950);
Redick v. Peony Park, 151 Neb. 442, 37 N.W.2d 801 (1949).
19 155 Neb. 599, 52 N.W.2d 808 (1952).
20 Id. at 608, 52 N.W.2d at 813.
21 149 Neb. 679, 32 N.W.2d 199 (1948).
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cited Borchard's extensive treatise on declaratory actions:
22
Actions for declaratory judgments brought by individuals to test
or challenge the propriety of public action often fail on this
ground, either because the plaintiff is deemed not to have an
adequate personal interest in the issue, or because the public offi-
cer or other person selected as a defendant has no special duties
in relation to the matter which would be affected by any eventual
judgment. The absence of adversary or the correct adversary
parties is in principle fatal.23
The right sought to be established or enforced must be asserted
against one who has an interest in contesting it. In the Miller case
the plaintiffs questioned the validity of a state tax statute by bring-
ing an action against parties who had no duties to perform or
responsibilities to discharge in connection with the Community
Property Act. The state tax commissioner was charged by law with
the duty of enforcing the provisions of the tax law; whether the
act was held constitutional or unconstitutional would not affect the
assessor's valuation of the taxable property or the treasurer's in-
terest in the amount of tax revenue in the county; therefore, they
had no interest whatever in the upholding of the act.
Conversely, a declaratory judgment action was successful in
declaring unconstitutional an act imposing a tax of fifteen cents per
pound on oleomargarine in Thorin v. Burke.24 However, the de-
fendant was the director of the Department of Agriculture and
Inspection in the State of Nebraska, whose duty it would be to en-
force such law over the entire state.25 The plaintiff, a retail grocer,
brought the action against a party legally competent to jeopardize
his rights. Unlike the Miller case, the parties' interests were truly
adverse, that is, the claim was asserted against a defendant inter-
ested in opposing it.
(2) Lack of a Legally Protectible Interest in the Petitioner
The party seeking declaratory relief must have what the court
considers a legal interest in the controversy. In Nebraska Seedsmen
Ass'n v. Department of Agriculture & Inspection,26 the plaintiff or-
ganization brought an action for a declaratory judgment alleging
that a controversy had arisen between the parties regarding the
22 BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 76 (2d ed. 1941).
23 149 Neb. 679, 683, 32 N.W.2d 199, 202 (1948).
24 146 Neb. 94, 18 N.W.2d 664 (1945).
25 However, the State of Nebraska is not a necessary party in a tax
assessment action. S.S. Kresge Co. v. Jensen, 164 Neb. 833, 83 N.W.2d
569 (1957).
26 162 Neb. 781, 77 N.W.2d 464 (1956).
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interpretation of the Nebraska Seed Law,27 with particular reference
to the use of non-warranty and disclaimer provisions in the labeling
of seeds offered for sale. The defendants asserted the right to
prohibit disclaimer clauses on the containers. Apparently, however,
the plaintiff organization had not been, and could not be accused of
violating the interpretation that the defendants sought. The trial
had resulted in a judgment sustaining the defendants' interpreta-
tion of the law. The supreme court reversed with directions to
dismiss the action, and held that a declaratory judgment grants the
plaintiff an opportunity to have his own rights determined, but not
some other person's rights when his own are not invaded or dis-
turbed. Even though the plaintiff alleged that it was an unincor-
porated association organized for the purpose of carrying on the
business of promoting and improving the growing and marketing
of agricultural seeds, the court found that the plaintiff did not have
a right in the controversy.28 Perhaps the court ignored the fact
that the members of the association had a direct interest in the re-
sult of the suit, the adjudication of which would have had a binding
effect upon the members, since the prohibition of disclaimer clauses
could affect the marketing of agricultural seeds.
Apparently, the issue in the Nebraska Seedsmen Ass'n case was
moot or hypothetical. True, the plaintiff association would have
liked to have had the rights of seed sellers determined; but the
court believed that it was merely seeking advice, not trying to set-
tle a controversy between itself and the Department of Agriculture
and Inspection. Thus, an action is likely to be dismissed as failing
to present a justiciable controversy if the plaintiff does not have a
real interest in the asserted claim. This action probably could have
been successfully brought by a seller or sellers of seeds whose right
to use disclaimer or limitation of liability provisions was threatened
by the statute.
29
(3) Ripeness of the Controversy
In order to warrant a declaratory judgment, the controversy
which is the subject of the action-must be ripe for judicial deter-
.2Z NEB. REV. STAT. -§§. 81-2,135.01-46.01 (Reissue -1964).-
23 162 Neb. 781, 783, 77 N.W.2d 464, 465 (1956). The court's denial of
relief was based on the fact that no other capacity was pleaded.
29 In Smithberger v. Banning, 130 Neb. 354, 265 N.W. 10 (1936), the
Nebraska Petroleum Marketers, Inc. were not allowed to intervene in
a declaratory action seeking to invalidate a state gasoline tax. The
court found that the intervenor was not subject to the terms of the
statute and furthermore, failed to allege its authority to appear on
behalf of its membership.
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mination; that is, the action must not be brought prematurely.30
It is a well established rule that the court will declare rights only
under an existing situation and not under a situation which may or
may not arise in the future. For example, an interested party may
bring an action for the declaration of his rights so that he can deter-
mine what steps, if any, he must take under an existing statute.
However, he may not challenge the validity of a law before it is
enacted.3 '
Likewise, the plaintiff who seeks a declaratory judgment con-
cerning his rights which are not yet vested, but which could become
vested, will be dismissed from the court without a hearing. Thus,
in Price v. Shiels,3 2 declaratory relief was denied to contingent re-
maindermen who sought to have the terms of a will construed and
their interests declared. The plaintiffs could acquire no vested in-
terest, under the terms of the will, until the holder of the life estate
died. The court held that a declaratory judgment proceeding is only
available for the determination of present rights which have become
fixed under an existing state of facts, and is not available for the
decision or determination as to a future right or status which de-
pends on a state of facts which are future, contingent, or uncertain.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska has employed various reasons
for its findings of nonjusticiability in refusing to grant declaratory
relief. Simply stated, the requirement of a justiciable controversy
is a necessary condition for the exercise of judicial power. This is
understandable since it is a waste of the court's time to require it to
determine issues which may never arise. Though the existence of
the condition of justiciability is not always easy to ascertain, it
seems that an issue will be considered justiciable for purposes of a
declaratory judgment if either: 1) a cause of action for coercive re-
lief has already accrued to one of the litigants, or 2) it is likely that
a coercive action will accrue if the declaration is denied. It is the
policy of the uniform act to afford a remedy for the removal of un-
certainty without making it necessary to await the event of the rel-
atively certain wrong which would give rise to coercive litigation.
If such facts can be shown, it is likely that the requirements of
justiciability for declaratory relief have been met.33
30 Redick.v. Peony Park, 151 Neb. 442, 37 N.W.2d 801 (1949).
31 Banning v. Marsh, 124 Neb. 207, 245 N.W. 775 (1932).
32 149 Neb. 330, 31 N.W.2d 91 (1948).
33 The test of when a justiciable controversy exists has been stated in
various terms: (before the last irrevocable step is taken which will
necessitate coercive relief). JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1.10, at 29 (1965);
(a probability from human experience that danger threatens or legal
rights are in jeopardy or insecure). BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS
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B. -JUDICIAL DISCRETION TO ENTERTAIN THE PETITION
In Nebraska, the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act has been
interpreted to be a discretionary remedy, and litigants are not
vested with an absolute right to a determination of the controversy
existing between them.34 Such discretion is exercised on the basis
of the facts and legal contentions of each case and after considera-
tion of all the circumstances.3 5 The court may exercise its discre-
tion to refuse the remedy if it appears that:' 1) the judgment will
not finally settle the uncertainty or controversy, or 2) the parties
have an alternative remedy which would be more appropriate under
the circumstances. 36 Such discretion to deny declaratory relief is
also recognized under the federal act, which makes no express pro-
vision for the practice.3 7
(1) The Complete Termination of the Uncertainty or Controversy
The uniform act provides that a declaration may be denied
when the controversy would not be finally settled. The statute
states the following criterion for the exercise of discretion: "The
court may refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment or de-
cree where such judgment or decree, if rendered or entered,
would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to
the proceeding." 38
__ -ThaNebraska courts have held that it. isunlikely that a declara-
tion will terminate the uncertainty or controversy gi'ing rise to the
proceeding, either if an interested party has not been brought into
637 (2d ed. 1941); (if a disputed claim be accompanied by imminent
litigation). 53 COLUm. L. REV. 1130 (1953).
34. Southern Neb. Power Co. v. Village of Deshler, 130 Neb. 133; 264 N.W.
555 (1936). -"
" "The use of' a declar."toi'y '3idgment, while'discretionary with the court,
is nevertheless dependent 'upon facts and 6ircumstances rendering it
u~eful and he6essary. The court's, discrtioii should -be exercised with
caution: Juirisdiction should be assumed only where the court is sat-
isfied that an actual controversy exists between competent parties
" who are" before, the couit, .afid that the :delaration sought. will be a
practical help in ending the controversy or in stabilizing disputed legal
---relations -under the facts alleged and proved!. Graham v.. Beauchamp,
154 Neb. .889,.893, 50 N.W.2d 104,'107 (1951).
26. BoRcHARD, DECLARATORY;JUD GMENTS 296-99 -(2d- ed: 1941). A third
ground for denying declaratory relief; sometimes used, in other juris-
dictions, arises where the judgment, if .endered, would serve no useful
purpose. No Nebraska case, was found where declaratory relief was
denied for this reason.
37 Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am., 316 U.S. 491, (1942).
38 NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-21,154 (Reissue 1964).-
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the action,39 or if an issue has not been raised which the court deems
an important question for the complete termination of the con-
troversy.40
In Dobson v. Ocean Acc. & Guar. Corp.,41 the plaintiff insured
had been "threatened suit" by the city of Gillespie, Illinois, on the
grounds that plaintiff was liable to the city, under a construction
contract, for the loss the city had sustained in a previous personal
injury action. Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment against the
insurer, determining that, if plaintiff were liable to the city, loss
arising from such liability was covered by the defendant's policy.
The court, in exercising its discretion to grant declaratory relief,
held that since the issue of the plaintiff's liability to the city had
not been decided and was not raised in this action, a declaratory
judgment was not an available remedy. The court found that the
question of plaintiff's liability to the city was necessary to the com-
plete termination of the controversy. 42  In Southern Neb. Power
Co. v. Village of Deshler,43 an action was brought seeking a de-
claratory judgment that an ordinance was void. However, only one
member of the village board was made a party defendant. The
court held: "It is clear that the trial court in this case had no juris-
diction to determine any controversy between the plaintiff and the
members of the village board of Deshler, because the members of
the board are not parties to this action. '44 The plaintiff had failed
39 Custer Pub. Power Dist. v. Loup River Pub. Power Dist., 162 Neb. 300,
75 N.W.2d 619 (1956). "'More often, however, the court dismisses the
proceeding, on the ground that some designated necessary party or
parties should have been heard, not only for the information of the
court but because such a party might be affected by, even though not
bound by, the decision; and in so conclusive a proceeding it would be
neither just nor proper to render a judgment without hearing and
binding such interested person. Any suggestion, of course, that inter-
ested parties could be bound by a judgment in a proceeding to which
they were not parties served, with opportunity to be heard, would
encounter constitutional objections.'" Smithberger v. Banning, 130
Neb. 354, 359, 265 N.W. 10, 12-13 (1936), court citing BORcHPA, DE-
CLARATORY JUDGMENTS 104-06 (1934).
40 Dobson v. Ocean Acc. & Guar. Corp., 124 Neb. 652, 247 N.W. 789 (1933).
.41 Ibid.
42 The -plaintiff could not get jurisdiction over the city of Gillespie, Illi-
nois in Nebraska. Thus, the declaratory action was of no value under
these circumstances in completely settling the entire controversy.
However, the defendant insurer had contracted to defend the insured
in liability actions covered by the policy. To the insured, the expec-
tation that the insurer will perform its obligations may be as important
as the performance itself. See notes 78-81 infra and accompanying text.
43 130 Neb. 133, 264 N.W. 462 (1936).
44 Id. at 135, 264 N.W. at 464.
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to make all of the members of the board parties defendant, and
therefore all parties necessary to a complete termination of the
question were not before the court. A final binding adjudication
could not be made without their presence.45
The declaratory device is designed to provide a speedy and in-
expensive method of determining disputes and one which should be
liberally interpreted, and not restricted by technicalities. 46 Admit-
tedly, the requirement of a complete termination of the entire con-
troversy serves the purpose of avoiding multiple suits. However,
the parties before the court may have an important interest in
settling the single issue raised. It would seem that this interest of
the individual parties should be finally settled by a declaration if
no harm can be done to the persons who are not parties to the pro-
ceedings. In the Dobson case, for example, the settlement of the
responsibility of the insurer to the plaintiff under the insurance
contract, would not have substantially affected the rights of the city
to recover its claim against the insured. The declaration of that
issue would have been binding only upon those who were parties to
the action.
(2) Availability of Alternative Remedies
The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act states: "Courts of
record within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to de-
clare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further
relief is or could be claimed."47 This raises the alternative remedy
problem. It seems apparent from the language of the statute that
the purpose of the declaratory judgment is to give the litigant who
has a known civil remedy the alternative to choose a declaration as
a substitute remedy.4 However, the Nebraska courts have held
that a declaratory judgment should not be granted where an alter-
native remedy is available.
Thus, in Scudder v. County of Buffalo,49 where the plaintiff
45 Other cases where declaratory judgment has been denied because all
parties necessary to the termination of the controversy were not before
the court: Custer Pub. Power Dist. v. Loup River Pub. Power Dist.,
162 Neb. 300, 75 N.W.2d 619 (1956); Redick v. Peony Park, 151 Neb.
442, 37 N.W.2d 801 (1949); Wood Realty Co. v. Wood, 132 Neb. 817, 273
N.W. 493 (1937).
46 NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,160 (Reissue 1964).
47 NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,149 (Reissue 1964). (Emphasis added.)
48 This was expressed to be the purpose of the Uniform Declaratory
Judgments Act. BORcHAu, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS, 316-18 (2d ed.
1941).
49 170 Neb. 293, 102 N.W.2d 447 (1960).
764 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 45, NO. 4 (1966)
sought a declaration as to the rights of the parties growing out of
an alleged mistake in the assessment of plaintiff's property, the
petition was dismissed. The court pointed out that the statutes of
the state provided a remedy for the petitioner in this situation,50
and held that:
Where an exclusive remedy is provided, the declaratory judgment
act does not provide an additional remedy. A declaratory judg-
ment action can afford no relief to one who has failed to pursue
a full, adequate, and exclusive statutory remedy. In fact, the gen-
eral rule is that an action for a declaratory judgment will not be
entertained when another equally serviceable remedy has been
provided.51
The plaintiff in the Scudder case had alleged that the statutory
remedy was not adequate to meet the situation which confronted
him. However, the court apparently foreclosed consideration of the
adequacy of the alternative remedy and reinforced their interpre-
tation of the declaratory judgment act as providing an extraordi-
nary remedy. Thus the court not only repudiated the general
view, 52 but in effect held that the availability of another remedy
per se precludes declaratory relief.53
The Scudder case can be more easily reconciled with the inter-
pretation given the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act in other
jurisdictions if it is expressly limited to its facts. Since a statutory
remedy was available in the Scudder case, declaratory relief may be
unavailable as a result of the legislature having expressly desig-
nated some other remedy as an exclusive one for certain situations.
The problem is thus entirely one of statutory interpretation.5 4
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 57 expressly provides: "The
50 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 77-1501-13 (Reissue 1964). Valuations made by the
county board are appealable to the district court.
51 Scudder v. County of Buffalo, 170 Neb. 293, 296, 102 N.W.2d 447, 450
(1960). (Emphasis added.)
52 Maas v. Maas, 305 Ky. 490, 204 S.W.2d 798 (1947); Jones v. Robertson,
79 Cal. App. 2d 813, 180 P.2d 929 (1947).
53 See also Stewart v. Herten, 125 Neb. 210, 249 N.W. 552 (1933), where
under similar facts the court held the availability of another remedy
precludes declaratory relief.
54 If a statute gives a specific remedy for a specific type of action, the
declaratory judgment is understandably inapplicable. However, the
statute involved in Scudder provides: "Appeals may be taken from
any action of the county board of equalization to the district court. .. ."
NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-1510 (Reissue 1964). (Emphasis added.) Thus, it
would seem that the procedure provided was not expressly intended
as an exclusive statutory remedy. See York County Rural Pub. Power
Dist. v. O'Connor, 172 Neb. 602, 111 N.W.2d 376 (1961), which seems
to limit the Scudder case.
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existence of another adequate remedy does not preclude a judgment
for declaratory relief in cases where it is appropriate." Thus, un-
der the federal rules as well as the construction given the uniform
act in the majority of other jurisdictions, the declaratory remedy is
cumulative and alternative, not exclusive. 55 Apparently the Ne-
braska courts in the past have viewed the declaratory judgment
simply as a statutory expansion of equity jurisdiction, and thus in-
sist that the equitable requirement of lack of another adequate
remedy be maintained as a jurisdictional prerequisite for declara-
tory relief. However, there is no justification in the Uniform De-
claratory Judgments Act for such a proposition. Since no specific
provision is present in the act as to whether the action is to be
brought in law or equity, it apparently was the intention of the leg-
islature that the forum would depend on the issues involved and
the relief sought. This is indicated by the flexibility of the act in
providing for the use of juries for the trial of traditional jury ques-
tions.56 The declaratory action is a special form of action, neither
legal nor equitable, but sui generis.57 Declaratory relief may take
on the color of either equity or law, depending upon the nature of
the particular facts and issues involved. It is imperative to the
purpose of the declaratory action that the equitable requirement
of lack of another adequate remedy not be a prerequisite for ob-
taining relief.
Seemingly more understandable is the restriction that a de-
claratory judgment action will not be entertained if there is pending
other litigation in which the rights of the parties can be determined.
In exercising judicial discretion to permit a new petition for a dec-
laration by one of the parties to a pending action, the court should
consider these questions: 1) Was the other action pending before
the declaratory judgment proceeding was commenced? 2) Does the
pending action involve the same subject matter and issues presented
in the declaratory action? 3) Can these issues be tried with equal
facility in the other action? If these questions are answered in the
affirmative, the court will usually dismiss the declaratory action.58
In Phelps County v. City of Holdrege,5" the plaintiff county asked
the court to establish its status with regard. to redemption of land
from a judicial sale for delinquent taxes. The court denied declara-
tory relief because the identical question was decided in the former
independent action in the district court for Phelps County, and
55 Franklin Life Ins. Co. v.-Johnson, 157 F.2d 653 (10th Cir. 1946).
56 NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-21,157 (Reissue 1964).
57 BORCHARn, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS, 237-41 (2d ed. 1941).
58 Id. at 350-54.
59 133 Neb. 139, 274 N.W. 483 (1937).
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there was no appeal. The court held that "The declaratory judg-
ment law is not a substitute for new trial or appeal, nor does it
operate to supersede former adjudications or proper proceedings
already pending in a court having jurisdiction of parties and
subject-matter." 60 A declaratory judgment on the same issues in-
volved in a pending action between the same parties will not serve a
sufficiently useful purpose.
III. PARTICULAR APPLICATIONS OF DECLARATORY
RELIEF
A. RIGHTS, STATUS, AND LEGAL RELATIONS
The Nebraska Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act gives to the
courts within their respective jurisdictions the ". . . power to de-
clare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further
relief is or could be claimed.161 Accordingly, the existence or non-
existence of any right, duty, power, or privilege, or any fact on
which such legal relations depend, is susceptible to declaratory ad-
judication.
In York County Rural Pub. Power Dist. v. O'Connor,62 the plain-
tiff sought a declaration as to the reasonableness of rates for electri-
cal services when a controversy had arisen between the public
power district and its customers over a rate increase. The court
reversed the defendants' demurrer and held: "The very purpose of
the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act is to provide the relief
that plaintiff seeks, a declaration of the rights of the parties. ' 63
The defendants had refused to pay the new rate increase fixed by
the plaintiff and had remitted the sum of the previously existing
rate. In addition, the defendants had threatened the plaintiff with
an action for damages if the furnishing of electrical energy were
discontinued. Thus, the plaintiff would be required to bring an
action at each billing period for the amount due under its applicable
rate. Under these circumstances, the declaratory judgment pro-
vided an ideal remedy. The right of the public power district to
charge the increase in rates could be economically established or
denied and the controversy finally and completely terminated by a
declaration.
Determination of status is one of the most useful advantages of
the declaratory action, but unfortunately Nebraska has few such
60 Id. at 139, 274 N.W. at 483, syllabus by the court.
61 NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,149 (Reissue 1964).
62 172 Neb. 602, 111 N.W.2d 376 (1961).
63 Id. at 609, Ill N.W.2d at 380.
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cases. The status of a child with respect to its parent was held to
be within the contemplation of the statute providing for declara-
tory judgments in Carlson v. Bartels.64 The fact of parentage, im-
portant in establishing the child's right to share in a decedent's es-
tate, was determined by declaration. In Baum v. Baum Holding
Co.,65 the rights, status, and legal relation of a holding corporation
and its stockholders was found to be a proper subject for a declara-
tion.
The declaratory action has been put to more frequent and var-
ied uses to determine status in other jurisdictions where the uni-
form act is in effect. The action has been used to declare the
existence and validity of both marriage and divorce,6 6 and particu-
larly the legal effect of foreign divorces.6 7 Questions involving em-
ployment status have received declaratory determination,"" as well
as rights and duties with regard to unemployment compensation
funds. 69 The right to membership in an organization 70 and ques-
tions of citizenship7' are within the purview of the declaratory
action.
B. CONTRACTS AND WRITT INSTRUMENTS
The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act provides: "A con-
tract may be construed either before or after there has been a
breach thereof." 72  Thus, the declaratory judgment offers a rem-
edy in the situation where there is a dispute as to rights and duties
under a contract because of uncertainty. Apparently, any question
that may arise under a contract, whether it be the interpretation,
validity, effect, or the result produced by the contract, is a proper
subject for declaratory relief.73 By determining these issues before
breach, the declaratory judgment often enables the parties to avoid
64 143 Neb. 680, 10 N.W.2d 671 (1943).
6G 158 Neb. 197, 62 N.W.2d 864 (1954).
66 Chesny v. Chesny, 197 Misc. 768, 94 N.Y.S.2d 674 (Sup. Ct. 1950). How-
ever, a declaratory judgment action cannot be brought to set aside or
modify a divorce decree valid on its face. Burgess v. Burgess, 210 Ga.
380, 80 S.E.2d 280 (1954).
07 Lane v. Lane, 182 Misc. 656, 45 N.Y.S.2d 540 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
68 Watson v. Centro Espanol de Tampa, 158 Fla. 796, 30 So. 2d 288 (1947).
69 Washington Recorder Publishing Co. v. Ernst, 199 Wash. 176, 91 P.2d
718 (1939).
70 Carr v. Union Church, 186 Va. 411, 42 S.E.2d 840 (1947).
71 Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939).
72 NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-21,151 (Reissue 1964).
73 BORcHARi, DECLARATORY JXuMiNTS 505-28 (2d ed. 1941).
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hostilities and severance of economic relations. 74 Illustrative of the
use of the declaratory action in interpreting contracts are the cases
of Dorland v. Dorland7 5 where a marriage settlement and separa-
tion agreement was construed before a breach occurred, and E. K.
Buck Retail Stores v. Harkert,7 6 where an action was brought by a
corporation and its majority stockholders to test the validity of a
corporate control agreement. 77
Declaratory judgments are of great value and widely used in
interpreting insurance contracts.78 A declaration provides an es-
cape from the dilemma often encountered by an insurance company,
faced with the possibility of jeopardizing its rights by either de-
fending or refusing to defend a suit against the insured.79 Like-
wise, a declaration can be a desirable procedure from the standpoint
of the insured,8 0 whereby a speedy determination may be had of
the insured's rights under the policy.8 ' The parties to an insurance
contract can conveniently have their uncertainties resolved by seek-
ing a declaratory judgment.
C. TITLE AND PROPERTY RIGHTS
The disputed title or right to property, real or personal, is an
appropriate subject of declaratory relief. The right or title claimed
74 Borchard, Declaratory Judgments In Indiana, 19 IND. L.J. 175, 188
(1944). This is a particularly important factor with reference to busi-
ness contracts.
75 175 Neb. 233, 121 N.W.2d 28 (1963).
76 157 Neb. 867, 62 N.W.2d 288 (1959).
77 Other types of contracts which have been the subject of a declaratory
judgment in Nebraska include: (construction contract) Richardson v.
Waterite Co., 169 Neb. 263, 99 N.W.2d 265 (1959); (will) Perigo v.
Perigo, 158 Neb. 733, 64 N.W.2d 789 (1954); (lease agreement) Chesnut
v. Master Laboratories, 148 Neb. 378, 27 N.W.2d 541 (1947).
78 BoRcHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS (2d ed. 1941).
79 If the insurance company fails to defend the claimant's suit against the
insured, it cannot be certain that the insured will defend adequately.
On the other hand, to defend the insured might be a waiver of its
defense of noncoverage. In addition, to defend every action, without
even questioning the extent of the insurer's liability, would be ex-
tremely expensive and impractical. See National Union Fire Ins. Co.
v. Bruecks, 179 Neb. 642, 139 N.W.2d 821 (1966).
80 It is apparent that when the legality of a life insurance policy is ques-
tioned because of alleged fraud on the part of the insured, it is ex-
tremely important to both the insured and the insurer to have this
issue resolved before the death of the insured. Equitable Life Assur.
Soc. of United States v. Gillan, 70 F. Supp. 640 (D. Neb. 1945).
81 Under some circumstances this may be of great importance to the in-
sured. See Dobson v. Ocean Acc. & Guar. Corp., 124 Neb. 652, 247
N.W. 789 (1933).
COMMENTS
may find its source in a deed, will, written contract, or other in-
strument. Moreover, the action may be brought by an executor,
administrator, trustee, guardian or other fiduciary.8 2 Thus, in Gra-
ham v. Beauchamp,83 an action was brought by the guardian of the
plaintiff, seeking a declaration as to the rights of the plaintiff to the
ownership of certain cattle. The court interpreted the instrument
involved and found that a declaration of the rights or legal relations
to determine the title to personal property was a proper subject
for a declaratory action.
Likewise, in Father Flanagan's Boys' Home v. Graybill,s4 the
courts were found to have the power to grant a declaratory judg-
ment on questions of construction and validity of a will and the
property rights thereunder, provided there is an actual controversy
relating to the matter at issue. In addition, the Nebraska courts
have found the declaratory judgment appropriate for the deter-
mination of the validity and operation of a lease,8 5 the interpreta-
tion and effect of a deed, 86 the priority of liens on real property,87
the validity of a trust agreement,8 and controversies relating to an
estate of a decedent.8 9
In other jurisdictions the declaratory judgment has been effec-
tively used to determine the enforceability and effect of covenants
and restrictions," rights and duties in regard to easements and wa-
ter rights,9 ' and ownership of patents and copyrights.
92
D. CONSTITUTIONALITY AND CONSTRUCTION OF LEGISLATION
Under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act,
Any person . . .whose rights, status or other legal relations are
affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise,
may have determined any question of construction or validity
arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract, or fran-
82 NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,152 (Reissue 1964).
83 154 Neb. 889, 50 N.W.2d 104 (1951).
84 178 Neb. 79, 132 N.W.2d 304 (1964). See also Perigo v. Perigo, 158
Neb. 733, 64 N.W.2d 789 (1954).
85 Chesnut v. Master Laboratories, 148 Neb. 378, 27 N.W.2d 541 (1947).
80 City of Gering v. -Jones, 175 Neb. 626, 122 N.W.2d 503 (1963).
ST Nowka v. Nowka, 157 Neb. 57, 58 N.W.2d 600 (1953).
88 In re Reynolds Estate, 131 Neb. 557, 268 N.W. 480 (1936).
89 Hipsley v. Hipsley, 162. Neb. 518, 76 N.W.2d 462 (1956).
90 Hess v. Country Club Park, 213 Cal. 613, 2 P.2d 782 (1931).
91 Estey v. Susquehanna Pipeline Co., 199 Misc. 290, 98 N.Y.S.2d 560 (Sup.
Ct. 1950).
92 Treemond Co. v. Schering Corp., 122 F.2d 702 (3d Cir 1941).
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chise and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal rela-
tions thereunder.93
Nebraska has had a large number of declaratory judgment cases in-
volving various aspects of the validity or construction of statutes
and municipal ordinances. The declaratory action has proven to be
an important device for challenging statutory validity because of
the convenience and effectiveness of determining validity before
anyone has changed his position by following or ignoring a statute's
provisions.9 4 Illustrative of this advantage is the case of Webber v.
City of Scottsbluff. 95 The defendant city had passed an ordinance
prohibiting auction sales or similar activities on the streets and
sidewalks of the city. The plaintiff stood to be economically dam-
aged if he complied with the ordinance and would be subject to a
fine if its provisions were ignored. A declaratory judgment was
successfully brought and the ordinance was declared void.96
In addition, the declaratory action also serves the function of
challenging specific powers of public officers and agencies acting
under authority of a statute. Thus, in Armstrong v. Board of
Supervisors,97 the declaratory judgment was held to be proper in an
action brought by taxpayers to secure an interpretation of a statute
authorizing county boards to issue and sell bonds of the county for
the purpose of building a county hospital.98
If a law has not been enforced because of serious questions as to
its validity, an interested public official or governmental agency
may bring declaratory action to establish the law's status before any
injuries arise. For example, a declaratory action was brought by
93 NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,150 (Reissue 1964).
94 BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 1021 (2d ed. 1941).
95 141 Neb. 363, 3 N.W.2d 635 (1942).
96 Other cases where construction of statutes were found to be proper
subjects for the declaratory judgment: Turkey v. Douglas County.
133 Neb. 732, 277 N.W. 57 (1938) (constitutionality of delinquent tax
law); Stanton v. Mattson, 175 Neb. 767, 123 N.W.2d 844 (1963) (valid-
ity of installment sales law); Meyerkorth v. State, 173 Neb. 889, 115
N.W.2d 585 (1962) (constitutionality of compulsory school attendance
law); Moeller, McPherrin & Judd v. Smith, 127 Neb. 424, 255 N.W. 551
(1934) (action to declare tax assessment law invalid).
97 153 Neb. 858, 46 N.W.2d 602 (1951).
98 Other Nebraska cases where a declaratory action was brought to ques-
tion the powers or duties of public authorities and officers: Anderson
v. Herrington, 169 Neb. 391, 99 N.W.2d 621 (1959) (tax assessor);
Noble v. City of Lincoln, 153 Neb. 79, 43 N.W.2d 578 (1950) (city
officials); York County Rural Pub. Power Dist. v. O'Connor, 172 Neb.
602, 111 N.W.2d 376 (1961) (public power district); School Dist. of
Omaha v. Gass, 131 Neb. 312, 267 N.W. 528 (1936) (school board).
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the city of Omaha to test the validity of the Sunday closing law in
City of Omaha v. Lewis & Smith Drug Co.99
The declaratory judgment has been an extremely useful and
popular tool in Nebraska for determining the constitutionality and
proper construction of legislation, and the popularity of its use for
this purpose is obvious. Experience has proven that it is the sim-
plest way to challenge governmental action.
IV. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN THE DECLARATORY
ACTION
Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
"the procedure for obtaining a declaratory judgment shall be in
accordance with these Rules." Likewise, the procedural aspects of
the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act differ very little from the
established rules which apply to traditional actions.10 0 The declara-
tory action is intended to be merely a procedural device which
does not change the substantive rights of the parties.1 1
A. PLEADINGS
The pleadings used in a declaratory action are- basically the
same as those employed in an ordinary civil action, the single ex-
ception being that the plaintiff -demands a declaration rather than a
coercive judgment. The rules of pleading applicable to ordinary
civil actions also apply to declaratory actions. For example, a de-
claratory complaint is subject to a demurrer if it fails to state a
cause of action and summary judgment is allowed where only is-
sues of law are involved.10 2
A party seeking declar6itbry relief niust comply with tH estao-
lished rules of jurisdiction, venue, and service of process which gov-
ern ordinary actions. 0 3 Likewise, just as in other actions, the court
will consider the effect of the statute of limitations and laches.10 4
99 156 Neb. 650, 57 N.W.2d 269 (1953)..
100 Lickert v. City of Omaha, 144 Neb. -75, 12-N.W.2d 644 (1944)..
1 JAmES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1.10 (1965). .
102 Gottula v. Standard Reliance Ins Co,, 165-Neb. 1, 84 N.W.2d 179 (1957).
103 Father Flanagan's Boys' Home v. Graybill, 178 Neb. 79, 132 N.W.2d 304
(1964): Specifically, the uniform act contains a section governing
joinder of parties, NEB. Rl-s STAT. § 25-21,159- (Reissue 1964); and dis-
position of costs, NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-21,158 (Reissue 1964):
104 Maguire v. Hibernia Sav. & Loan Soc'y, "23 Cal.2d 719, 146 P.2d 673
(1944).
772 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 45, NO. 4 (1966)
B. TRIAL
The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act provides for a jury
trial in the same manner as in other civil actions: "When a pro-
ceeding . . . involves the determination of an issue of fact, such
issue may be tried and determined in the same manner as issues of
fact are tried and determined in other civil actions in the court in
which the proceeding is pending."'10 5
Even though the Nebraska courts have held declaratory relief
to be essentially equitable in nature, the act has been interpreted to
provide for a jury trial in the case of fact determinations when tra-
ditional legal issues are presented. Thus, the declaratory judgment
provides for a jury when issues appear which would have been
triable to a jury as a matter of right had a coercive action been
brought. 0 6
There may be combined with the request for a declaration, an
additional prayer for coercive relief.10 7 The plaintiff may not suf-
ficiently establish a right to the coercive relief for which he prays,
whereas the evidence may be sufficient for a declaratory judgment
in his favor. In this case, a declaratory judgment will settle the
controversy, even though the prayer for coercive relief is denied.
In addition, whenever necessary, as when the declaratory judgment
alone does not give sufficient relief or is not complied with, the
petition may apply for additional relief based on the previously
granted declaratory decree. 08 Such supplemental relief is not lim-
ited to further declaratory relief, but coercive enforcement may
be granted 109
105 NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,157 (Reissue 1964). Likewise, Rule 57 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides "[T]he right to trial by jury
may be demanded under the circumstances and in the manner provided
in Rules 38 and 39."
106 United States Auto. Ass'n v. Hills, 172 Neb. 128, 109 N.W.2d 174 (1961);
State Farm Mut. Autb. Ins. Co. v.'Kersey, 171 Neb. 212, 106 N.W.2d 31
(1960); Hawkeye Cas. Co. v. Stoker, 154 Neb. 466, 48 N.W.2d 623 (1951).
107 Richardson v. Waterite Co., 169 Neb. 263, 99 N.W.2d 265 (1959).
108 "Further relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree may be
granted whenever necessary or proper. The application therefor shall
be by petition to a court having jurisdiction to grant the relief. If the
application be deemed sufficient,-the court shall, on reasonable notice,
require any adverse party whose rights have been adjudicated by the
declaratory judgment or decree to show cause why further relief should
not be granted forthwith." NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-21,156 (Reissue 1964).
109 Noble v. City of Lincoln, 158 Neb. 457, 63 N.W.2d 475 (1954).
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C. REvIEw
Both the Federal and the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act
provide that declarations are reviewable as final judgments."0
Likewise, just as in a coercive suit, conclusions of law and findings
of fact carry the same binding effect under the principles of res
judicata."'
V. CONCLUSION
The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act provides: "Sections
25-21,149 to 25-21,164 are declared to be remedial; their purpose is
to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with
respect to rights, status, and other legal relations; and are to be
liberally construed and administered."'1 2
The maintaining of the declaratory action as extraordinary to
existing remedies, as opposed to an alternative remedy, will serious-
ly hamper its obvious usefulness. If liberally interpreted, however,
the declaratory judgment offers many advantages over traditional
actions. The declaratory action is preventive, not redressive as are
actions at law, and it enables adjudication before breach of legal
relations."3 Likewise, it is superior to the traditional action in
equity which is subject to numerous technical requirements, such as
the availability of a form of action." 4 By the use of the declara-
tory judgment, a petitioner is able to challenge the validity of a
penal statute without having to subject himself to its penalties."0
And finally, the declaratory action affords a speedy and inexpensive
method of judicial relief from uncertainty and insecurity. The
issues presented for decision are usually simple and the facts are
110 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1964), and NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,155 (Reissue 1964).
"I In re Estate of Reynolds, 131 Neb. 557, 268 N.W. 480 (1936).
112 NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,160 (Reissue 1964). (Emphasis added.)
11, "'It is hardly conceivable that any fundamental principal (sic) of our
government, beyond legislative control, prevents two disputants, each
of whom sincerely believes in the rightfulness of his own claim, but
each of whom wishes to abide by the law whatever it may be deter-
mined to be, from obtaining an adjudication of their controversy in
the courts without one or the other first doing something that is illegal
... if he is mistaken in his view of the law."' City of Lincoln v.
First Nat. Bank, 146 Neb. 221, 224, 19 N.W.2d 156, 158 (1945), court
citing State v. Grove, 109 Kan. 619, 623, 201 Pac. 82, 84 (1921).
114 Borchard, The Next Step Beyond Equity-The Declaratory Action, 13
U. CHi. L. REv. 145 (1946).
115 "[B]usiness men do not want to violate the law, with its penalties.
What they wish is a clarification, a guide to the meaning of the law,
so that they may avoid breaking it." BORcHARD, DECLARATORY Juno-
AiENTS 1021 (2d ed. 1941).
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often stipulated, thus greatly saving time.116
Vast areas exist in the field of law where declarations could be
used reasonably and with effective results. However, it should not
be thought of as a reformation of the entire legal system. On the
contrary, one filing a petition for a declaratory judgment in Ne-
braska should be certain that he casts his case in the form of a
justiciable controversy. He should anticipate the defense that the
declaration will not lie as an alternative to a traditional or statutory
remedy. Likewise, he will have to be prepared to cope with the
jurisdictional requirements of the traditional actions, present evi-
dence to a jury, and anticipate the common problems of appeal. In
short, it is almost necessary to treat the declaratory judgment as
merely another form of action.
Matthew A. Schumacher '67
116 Ports, Some Practical Uses of the Declaratory Judgment Law, 23 NEB.
L. REv. 189, 205 (1944).
